ties are often manifested in a very wide range of practices, not infrequently providing indirect evidence of mutually incompatible opinions. This evidence of collective uncertainty about the effects of policies and practices should prompt professionals and the public to find out which opinions are likely to be correct. A lack of empirical evidence supporting opinions does not mean that all the opinions are wrong or that, for the time being, policy and practice should not be based on people's best guesses. On matters of public importance, however, it should prompt efforts to obtain relevant evidence through evaluative research to help adjudicate among conflicting opinions.
Because professionals sometimes do more harm than good when they intervene in the lives of other people, their policies and practices should be informed by rigorous, transparent, up-to-date evaluations.
If advice as apparently innocuous and "theoretically sound" as recommending a baby's sleeping position can be lethal, there is clearly no room for complacency among professionals about their potential for harming those whom they purport to help. Evidence of collective uncertainty about the effects of their policies and practices should prompt the humility that is a precondition for rigorous evaluation. In a moving account, Judith Gueron (2002, 27-28) has reported how professionals delivering an education and training program for high school dropouts agreed to a randomized trial to assess its effects, in spite of their concern that this might fail to find any beneficial effects of their work. (In fact, the results of the trial were positive and led to a fifteen-site expansion serving hundreds of disadvantaged youth.) A recent example from medical research illustrates the importance of remaining uncertain about the effects of an intervention until reliable evidence is available showing that it has at least some beneficial effects that outweigh negative effects (Freed et al. 2001 ). There have been reasons to hope that transplantation of fetal tissue into the brains of people with Parkinson's disease can improve the symptoms of that distressing condition. Accordingly, a randomized trial comparing fetal implants with placebo surgery was done to assess whether these hopes were borne out by experience. Not only did the study fail to detect any beneficial effects of the implants; it eventually showed that they seemed to cause a serious deterioration in symptoms in some patients.
Those patients who had been randomly assigned to placebo surgery were initially protected from these unanticipated adverse effects. But because they had been desperate to receive this new treatment, the clinical investigators had promised at the time they were randomized to placebo that they, too, would receive fetal implants after one year of follow-up. Unfortunately, the full extent of the adverse effects had not become clear within this time period, so the controls, too, were exposed to an intervention for which only adverse effects, and no benefits, have so far been shown in controlled trials (Freed et al. 2001) .
One of the factors preventing a wider appreciation of the need for professional uncertainty and humility about the effects of interventions is that disappointing results tend to get hidden and forgotten. Studies that have yielded "disappointing" or "negative" results are less likely to be presented at scientific meetings; less likely to be reported in print; less likely to be published promptly, in full, in journals that are widely read, in English, and more than once; and less likely to be cited in reports of subsequent studies (Sterne, Egger, and Davey Smith 2001 ). An analysis of "successful case studies" in situational crime prevention (Clarke 1997) , for example, is likely to be less informative than a systematic review of all relevant case studies-successful and unsuccessful.
How Should Uncertainties about the Effects of Policy and Practice Be Addressed? Systematic reviews of existing research evidence: A scientific and ethical imperative Whatever the study designs considered appropriate for reliable detection of the effects of policies and practices, individual studies should not be considered in isolation but interpreted in the context of systematic reviews incorporating any other, similar studies. Application of this principle in practice is no more or less than an acknowledgement that science is a cumulative activity. Yet the principle is widely ignored within academia, not only in "stand alone" reviews but also in the Discussion sections of reports of new studies (Clarke, Alderson, and Chalmers 2002).
The science of research synthesis-as in any other scientific research-implies that those who practice it will take steps to avoid misleading themselves and others by ignoring biases and the effects of chance. A systematic review thus has the same basic components as any other scientific investigation, and so involves ? stating the objectives of the research; ? defining eligibility criteria for studies to be included; ? identifying (all) potentially eligible studies; ? applying eligibility criteria;
? assembling the most complete data set feasible; ? analyzing this data set, using statistical synthesis and sensitivity analyses, if appropriate and possible; and * preparing a structured report of the research.
It is not easy to conceptualize any justification for ignoring these principles, regardless of the sphere of scientific activity or the study designs and type of data avail- Hammersley (2001) , for example, criticized the concept because the positivist model is committed to "procedural objectivity"; and he rejects the notion that bias "can and must be minimised," because this is "assumed to maximise the chances of producing valid conclusions" (p. 545). Hammersley's unfamiliarity with the field of research synthesis is revealed most clearly in the following:
To be even more provocative, we could ask whether some of these forms of synthesis actually constitute reviewing the literature at all. A few seem to be closer to actually doing research, rather than reviewing it. (Hammersley 2002, 4) This is a remarkably tardy insight, coming as it does two decades after a fellow educational researcher published a seminal paper pointing out that "integrative research reviews" are research projects in their own right (Cooper 1982) .
Ignorance about the field of research synthesis and cavalier lack of concern about bias in reviews may simply reflect views about the purposes of research. Surveys often reveal wide variations in the type and frequency of practice and policy interventions, and this evidence of collective uncertainty should prompt the humility that is a precondition for rigorous evaluation.
Indeed, a variety of study designs are required to assess the effects of specific factors on some health or social characteristic, life course, or putative "outcome." As the British sociologist John Goldthorpe (2001) has noted, a fundamental issue is whether the researchers can manipulate the factors concerned. Often this will not be possible, for example, in efforts to understand the effects on child development of genetic characteristics or of divorce. Studies of the relationship between child development and these factors may help to develop theory about the nature of the relationship and lead to ideas about how to intervene in an effort to protect or improve child development.
It is at this point when interventions have been conceptualized on the basis of theory derived from observed associations-that it is important to ensure rigorous evaluation of the effects of these interventions, for example, gene therapy, marriage guidance, or child counseling. All such interventions can, in principle, be manipulated, and empirical evaluation in controlled experiments can assess whether they have the effects predicted by theory.
Sometimes the results of controlled experiments will be consistent with theory and can inform the development of policy and practices. On other occasions, controlled experiments will not yield evidence of the intervention effects predicted by theory. This does not necessarily mean that the theory is wrong; but it does mean that the possible reasons for the discrepancy between the predicted and observed effects should be explored, possibly leading to a refinement or rejection of the theory; and it should certainly be a warning that deploying the intervention in practice may do more harm than good.
Estimates of intervention effects vary with study design
Reliable studies of the effects of interventions are those in which the effects of policies or practices are unlikely to be confused with the effects of biases or chance. Rarely, estimates of the effects of interventions are so large that they are very unlikely to reflect the effects of insufficiently controlled biases or chance. Returning to an earlier example, once the adverse effects of placing babies to sleep on their tummies had been recognized, the effect of promulgating the opposite advice to the public in "Back to Sleep" campaigns was dramatic-a reduction in death rates to between a half and a quarter of their previous levels-and unlikely to be explained by biases or regression to the mean (Gilbert 1994; Wennergren et al. 1997) .
Usually, however, plausible effects of policies are modest but worth knowing about. In these circumstances, research syntheses must be designed in ways that minimize the effects of biases and chance. For example, we would probably still not have learned that very low doses of aspirin offer the potential for an important reduction in the risk of suffering cardiovascular morbidity and mortality had inves- There is no easy escape from the dilemma posed by these differences. Although observational data yield estimates of effects that are larger, on average, than those using data from randomized trials, in any particular instance it is not possible to predict whether different estimates will emerge using the two different approaches. One cannot even predict with confidence the direction of any differences that are found ( probably not be conceptualized by many people as a poorly controlled experiment, yet that is just what it was. Had he proposed testing the effect of his advice on infant mortality in a well-controlled evaluation, however, many people would have had no hesitation in characterizing that as "an experiment," invoking all the "guinea pig" images conjured up by that term in the public's mind. As noted in a Lancet editorial published more than a decade ago, "The clinician who is convinced that a certain treatment works will almost never find an ethicist in his path, whereas his colleague who wonders and doubts and wants to learn will stumble over piles of them" (Medical ethics 1990, 846) . Or, as put more bluntly by the pediatrician Richard Smithells (1975, 41) , "I need permission to give a drug to half of my patients, but not to give it to them all."
This double standard (Chalmers and Lindley 2000) results in some bizarre ethical analyses (see, for example, Graebsch 2000) . Professionals who are uncertain about whether a particular intervention (a policy or practice) will do more good than harm, and so wish to offer it only within the context of a controlled trial so that they protect people in the face of current uncertainty and learn about its effects, are expected to observe elaborate informed consent rituals. If exactly the same intervention is offered by other professionals-because it was recommended during their professional training three decades previously, or because there is a plausible theory that suggests it will be helpful, or because it is an accepted routine, or because they or the institutions for which they work have a vested financial or political interest in promulgating it (Oxman, Chalmers, and Sackett 2001)-the standard of consent is relaxed.
People not infrequently raise questions about the ethics of well-controlled, randomized experiments designed to address uncertainties about the effects of inadequately evaluated policies and practices. They would do well to consider the ethics of acquiescing in professional promulgation of the same policies and practices among recipients who have not been made aware either of the lack of reliable evidence of their effects or of the real reasons that they are being recommended to accept these interventions.
What can be done to reduce the effects of chance?
As with the methods to reduce biases in systematic reviews, social scientists and statisticians in the United States were prominent among those developing methods to reduce the effects of chance using quantitative synthesis of the results of separate but similar studies (Chalmers, Hedges, and Cooper 2002). Indeed, it was an American social scientist who coined the term "meta-analysis" to describe this process (Glass 1967) .
Sometimes meta-analysis is impossible with the data available, and even when it is possible it may not be appropriate. When it is both possible and judged appropriate, however, meta-analysis can reveal "reconcilable differences" among studies. The Cochrane Collaboration logo (Figure 1 This diagram shows the results of a systematic review of randomized trials of a short, inexpensive course of a corticosteroid given to women expected to give birth prematurely. The first of these randomized trials was reported in 1972. The diagram summarizes the evidence that would have been revealed had the available randomized trials been reviewed systematically a decade later: it indicates strongly that corticosteroids reduce the risk of babies dying from the complications of immaturity. By 1991, seven more trials had been reported, and the picture in the logo had become still stronger. This treatment reduces the odds of the babies of these women dying from the complications of immaturity by 30 to 50 percent. Because no systematic review of these trials had been published until 1989, however, most obstetricians had not realized that the treatment was so effective. As a Because similar numbers of boys in the experimental and control groups went on to reoffend, the authors concluded that therapeutic communities were ineffective and that randomized trials are inappropriate for assessing the effects of institutional interventions.
Had they taken account of the confidence interval surrounding the point estimate of the difference between experimental and control groups, as well as the results of other, similar studies, they might have come to a more cautious conclusion (Table 1 ). An overall estimate of the effects of therapeutic communities based on a systematic review of eight randomized trials suggests that this category of intervention may halve the odds of adverse outcomes, an effect of great public importance if true. An analysis restricted to the two trials of the "secure democratic" model studied by Clarke and Cornish (1972) suggests that although the beneficial effect may be somewhat less in these, the evidence is still suggestive of a potentially very important benefit. As a consequence of a failure to take proper account of the effects of chance, a useful methodology and a useful intervention may both have been jettisoned prematurely.
Systematic Reviews Need to Be Rigorous, Transparent, and Up to Date
Whatever decisions are made about which studies are eligible for inclusion in systematic reviews, and whether or not meta-analysis is used to analyze them, reviews should be published in sufficient detail to enable readers to judge their reliability. The advent of electronic publishing has transformed the potential for providing the detail required and allows systematic reviews to be updated when additional data become available and improved in other ways when ways of doing this are identified, for example, to incorporate relevant qualitative data (see, for example, Burns et al. 2001 ). Electronic publication also facilitates prompt publication of comments and criticisms.
The advantages of electronic publication are particularly welcome when the matter at issue is very contentious. A very extensive systematic review of the effects of water fluoridation (www.york.ac.uk/inst/crd/fluorid.htm) shows how electronic media enable research synthesis to be done transparently, accountably, and democratically. For manyyears, there have been two opposing lobbies on this issue in the United Kingdom. Following a debate in the House of Lords, the government commissioned the NHS Centre for Reviews and Dissemination in York to review the relevant evidence. An advisory group, on which the two main warring parties were both represented, was established to agree a protocol for the review before the data collection started. The list of studies to be assessed for eligibility was posted on a public Web site, and people were invited to suggest additional studies for consider-ation. As the review progressed, the Web site showed the results of applying the agreed inclusion and exclusion criteria and displayed the data abstracted from eligible studies and eventually the draft data tables. As it happens, the investigators were unable to identify any randomized experiments of water fluoridation, and they were disappointed with the quality of most of the observational data (McDonagh et al. 2000) . (These suggested a modest reduction in caries and an increase in disfiguring dental fluorosis.)
This transparent process is relevant to a point made by the president of the Royal Statistical Society in 1996. After referring approvingly to the Cochrane Collaboration-which prepares, maintains, and disseminates systematic reviews of the effects of healthcare interventions (Chalmers 1993 (Smith 1996) It was after reading this presidential address and Robert Boruch's excellent book, Randomized Experiments for Planning and Evaluation (1997), that I decided to beat a path to the latter's door in October 1998. I wanted to try to persuade him to take up the challenge of leading an effort to establish an analogue to the Cochrane Collaboration to prepare systematic reviews of social and educational interventions. For reasons that should now be clear, although I felt it was essential that such collaboration should be international, I believed that it would fail without the leadership and active involvement of social scientists in the United States, and I suggested that it might be named after one of them-Donald Campbell.
The Cochrane Collaboration and the Campbell Collaboration are both exploiting the advantages of electronic media. Electronic publication means that protocols (containing the introduction to and materials and methods planned for each review) as well as complete reports of systematic reviews can be made publicly available in considerably more detail and promptly after submission than is usually possible with print journals, and that they can be modified in the light of new data or comments.
As far as I am aware, these two collaborations currently provide the only international infrastructure for preparing and maintaining systematic reviews in the fields of health and social care and education. Estimates suggest that more than ten thousand people are now contributing to the Cochrane Collaboration (which was inaugurated in 1993), most of them through one or more of fifty Collaborative Review Groups (all international), which have collectively published nearly two thousand systematic reviews in The Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews. Members of these groups are supported by ten Cochrane Methods Groups (all international) and twelve Cochrane Centres, which are geographically based, and share collective responsibility for global coverage (www.cochrane.org). their choices about interventions, these discrepancies obviously have practical implications: which reviews should they believe? As I have made clear elsewhere, evidence of the discrepant conclusions of systematic and narrative reviews in the health field leave me in no doubt about which type of review I wish to be taken into account when I am a patient (Chalmers 1995 (Chalmers , 2001 ). And if I had a delinquent teenage son, I would be in no doubt that I would not wish him to be exposed to a "Scared Straight" program, however many uncontrolled before-and-after observational studies suggested that this would divert him from a criminal career (Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino, and Buehler 2003). Put bluntly, it is time that those academics who offer general-often polemic-criticisms of efforts to reduce the effects of bias and chance in reviews begin to face up to the reality that different materials and methods used for reviews usually result in different conclusions, and show which conclusions they would prefer, and why. None of the foregoing is meant to suggest that systematic reviews of research evidence speak for themselves. They do not, as has been stated repeatedly by those involved in this work. But up-to-date, reliable, systematic reviews of research evidence, or a demonstration that no relevant research exists, should be regarded as desirable and often essential for informing policy and practice. Judgments will always be needed about how to use the evidence derived from evaluative research. As well as the research evidence, these judgments need to take account of needs, resources, priorities and preferences, and other factors. This brings me back to the rationale for evaluations of policy and practice that are rigorous, transparent, and up to date, namely, that policy makers and practitioners who intervene in other people's lives should acknowledge that although they act with best of intentions, they may sometimes do more harm than good. That possibility should be sufficient motivation for them to ensure that their prescriptions and proscriptions are informed-even if not dictated-by reliable research evidence.
Concluding Observations
I have tried to make clear and to justify in this article how I conceptualize reliable research evidence. This entails the preparation of systematic reviews designed to minimize bias, drawing on research studies designed to minimize bias. I have deliberately concentrated on bias because the other important issue, taking account of the effects of chance, is a more straightforward matter (by using metaanalysis and doing larger studies). I believe that the principle of minimizing bias applies across all of science, and certainly in applied fields like the health and social sciences, because of the impact research may have on policies and practices.
In conclusion, my interest in research to assess the effects of interventions arises from a long-standing concern that, acting with the best of intentions, policy makers and practitioners have sometimes done more harm than good when interfering in the lives of others. I believe that the empirical evidence showing associations between study design and study results-whether among reviews or among individual studies-is likely to be explained by differential success in controlling biases. If only as a patient, therefore, I want decisions about my care to take account of the results of systematic reviews and studies that have taken measures to reduce the effects of biases and chance. As a citizen, too, I want these principles to be respected more generally-by policy makers, practitioners, and the public-than they are currently. However, to return to my starting point, uncertainty and humility among policy makers, practitioners, and researchers are the preconditions for wider endorsement of the approaches I have outlined. Sadly, these qualities are too often in short supply.
